Abstract. The concept of timed-released encryption with pre-open capability (TRE-PC) was introduced by Hwang, Yum and Lee. In a TRE-PC scheme, a message is encrypted in such a way that it can only be decrypted at a certain point in time or if the sender releases a piece of trapdoor information known as a pre-open key. This paper examines the security model for a TRE-PC scheme, demonstrates that a TRE-PC scheme can be constructed using a KEM-DEM approach, and provides an efficient example of a TRE-PC scheme.
Introduction
The concept of Timed-Release Encryption (TRE) is attributed to May [15] . In a TRE scheme, a message is encrypted in such a way that it can be decrypted by an authorised receiver only after a certain point in time. An unauthorised receiver should not be able to determine any information about the message from the ciphertext, and an authorised receiver should not be able to determine any information about the message before the stated release time. It is worth mentioning that some other timed primitives have been developed, for example, "price via processing" by Dwork and Naor [12] , timed key escrow by Bellare and Goldwasser [1, 2] , and timed commitments by Boneh and Noar [5] .
In the literature, there are two approaches used to construct TRE schemes. One approach is based on Merkle's time-lock puzzle technique [16] and involves encrypting the message in such a way that any computer attempting to decrypt the message will take at least a certain amount of time to solve the underlying computational problem [1, 7, 17] . The other approach is to use a trusted time server, which, at an appointed time, will assist in releasing a secret to help decrypt the ciphertext (e.g. [6, 9, 17] ). Generally, time-server-based schemes require interaction between the server and the users, and should prevent possible malicious behaviour of the time server. In this paper, we shall only be concerned with public-key TRE schemes that make use of time servers.
In standard TRE schemes, the receiver can only decrypt the ciphertext at (or after) the release time. If the sender changes its mind after the ciphertext is sent, and wishes the receiver to decrypt the message immediately, then the only thing that the sender can do is to re-send the plaintext to the receiver in such a way that the receiver can immediately decrypt the message. However, in some circumstances, we may need a special kind of TRE schemes, in which a mechanism enables the receiver to decrypt the ciphertext before the release time without requiring the sender to re-send the plaintext. Recently, Hwang, Yum, and Lee [14] proposed such a scheme, which they term a Timed-Release Encryption Scheme with Pre-Open Capability (TRE-PC). In a TRE-PC scheme, a message is encrypted in such a way that it can only be decrypted at a certain point in time, or if the sender releases a piece of trapdoor information called a pre-open key. It should be infeasible for any user except for the intended receiver to determine any information about the message from the ciphertext, and the receiver should only be able to determine any information about the message after the release time or if they are given the pre-open key. In the HYL model, a trusted time server is required to periodically issue a timestamp, but realtime interaction between the trusted time server and the messege senders is not needed.
Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner gave a number of applications of Timed Released Encryption including electronic auctions, key escrow, chess moves, release of documents over time, payment schedules, press releases and etc. [17] . As a special type of TRE scheme, a TRE-PC scheme is always a possible substitute of a standard TRE scheme in all the possible applications where the latter is used. In fact, we can argue that TRE-PC scheme is more suitable than the general TRE scheme in most of these applications. Taking the electronic auction as an example, normally bidders in an auction seal their bid so that it can be opened after the bidding period is closed. However, if a bidder wishes to confirm their bid to the auctioneer at some point before the pre-defined open time, then they may come across some problems if a standard TRE scheme is adopted. Document escrow provides another useful example. Many legal systems require that classified governmental information is disclosed after a certain period of time. This can be achieved by using a TRE-PC scheme, through which the classified information can be encrypted by the public key of a special agent which is responsible for disclosing classified information. Note that no original classified information is required to be stored, and in the case that the information needs to be prematurely released, a pre-open key can be sent to the special agent which is able to decrypt the encrypted classified information.
The Security Model for a TRE-PC Scheme

Notation
Let N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} be the set of natural numbers and {0, 1}
* the set of all bit strings. If k ∈ N then {0, 1} k is the set of bit strings of length k and 1 k is the string of k ones. If A is a randomised algorithm, then y $ ← A(x; O) denotes the assignment to y of the output of A when run on input x with fresh random coins and with access to oracle O; we write y ← A(x; O) if A is deterministic. If S is a finite set, then x $ ← S denotes the random generation of an element x ∈ S using the uniform distribution. A function ν :
The HYL Security Model
In the paper that proposes the concept of timed-release encryption with pre-open capability, Hwang, Yum, and Lee [14] propose a security model against which the security of a TRE-PC scheme could be assessed. We refer to this model as the HYL model. A TRE-PC scheme proposed in the HYL model consists of six polynomial-time algorithms. A Setup algorithm is initially executed by a trusted time server. This algorithm outputs a series of system parameters and a master key for the time server. The time server uses this master key with the Ext TS algorithm to create a "timestamp" for a time t. A user generates their own encryption and decryption keys using the Gen PK algorithm. Encryption can then be performed using the Enc algorithm and a pre-open key generated using the Gen RK algorithm. These two algorithms must both take the same randomly generated secret value v as input if the pre-open key is going to help decrypt the ciphertext. Lastly, a ciphertext can be decrypted using the Dec algorithm, either using the appropriate timestamp or the pre-open key. The HYL security model claims to consider two types of adversary: an outsider attacker (which could be "either a dishonest time server or an eavesdropper who tries to decrypt a legal receiver's ciphertext") and an inside attacker (who tries to decrypt a ciphertext before the release time without the pre-open key). Due to size constraints, we will not reproduce the HYL security models which can be found in the full version of the paper [11] . However, we suggest that the HYL model is incomplete and does not model all of the possible attacks that can be made against a TRE-PC scheme. In particular, 1. In the HYL model, the decryption process is described by one single algorithm, which works in two different modes depending on the input. We feel it is therefore more appropriate to formalise the decryption process as two independent algorithms. 2. In the HYL model, the means by which the secret value v used by the Enc and Gen RK algorithms is generated is never specified. We consider it more appropriate to remove the concept of a secret value, and have a single encryption algorithm that outputs both a ciphertext and the pre-open key for that ciphertext.
3. In the HYL model for an inside attacker, the attacker is able to obtain a timestamp for any time period except for the release time of the challenge ciphertext. In reality a receiver will only ever attempt to mount this attack before the release time of the challenge ciphertext. Hence, the HYL model is too strict. This is a problem as it is often advantageous if the timestamp for a given time period enables the receiver to decrypt all the messages that were encrypted for release at earlier times. 4. The HYL model does not give an outside attacker access to the pre-open key. However, it is realistic to assume that an outside attacker might be able to observe the pre-open key as it is being sent to the legitimate receiver. 5. The HYL model claims that an outside attacker captures the abilities of "either a dishonest time server or an eavesdropper who tries to decrypt a legal receiver's ciphertext". However, an outside attacker is not given access to the time server's master key and therefore does not model a dishonest time server. 6. A TRE-PC scheme allows the sender to release pre-open key which enable the receiver to decrypt a ciphertext before its release time. In some circumstances, the sender may wish to make the receiver decrypt a false message different from which was originally sent, by sending a false pre-open key to the receiver. This type of attack is not considered in the HYL model.
A new security model for TRE-PC schemes
We propose a new formulation and security model for a TRE-PC schemes. In our formulation, a TRE-PC scheme Π is given by six probabilistic, polynomial time algorithms:
1. Setup: Run by the time server, this setup algorithm takes a security parameter 1 as input, and generates a secret master-key mk and the global parameters param. We assume that all subsequent algorithms takes param implicitly as an input. 2. Gen: Run by a user, this user key generation algorithm takes a security parameter 1 as input, and generates a public/private key pair (pk r , sk r ). 3. Ext: Run by the time server, this timestamp extraction algorithm takes mk and a time t as input, and generates a timestamp T S t for the time t. 4. Enc: Run by a sender, this encryption algorithm takes a message m, a release time t, and the receiver's public key as input, and returns a ciphertext C and its pre-open key V C . It should be noted that initially the sender should send the ciphertext C in company with the release time t to the receiver, therefore the receiver can know the release time of C. The sender stores the pre-open key V C and publishes it when pre-opening the ciphertext C. 5. Dec RK : Run by the receiver, this decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext C,
the pre-open key V C , and the receiver's private key as input, and returns either the plaintext or an error message (⊥). In reality, the receiver can only run this algorithm after the sender releases the pre-open key V C .
6. Dec PK : Run by the receiver, this decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext C, a timestamp T S t which is determined by the release time accompanied with C, and the receiver's private key as input, and returns either the plaintext or an error message (⊥).
In the proposed model, we consider the following four kinds of adversaries:
-Outside adversaries who do not know the master key of the time server and wish to break the confidentiality of a message. -Curious time servers who knows the master key of the time server and wish to break the confidentiality of a message. -Legal but curious receivers who try to decrypt the ciphertext before the release time without the pre-open key. -Legal but malicious senders who try to make the receiver recover a false message different from which was originally sent.
This gives rise to four separate security models, shown in Fig. 1 . All of these models mirror the standard definition for confidentiality in public-key encryption except for the binding model, which models the capability of an attacker to produce a ciphertext for which the two decryption algorithms return different messages. Each attacker may have access to one or more of the following oracles:
1. An Ext oracle that takes a time t as input and outputs the timestamp T S t = Ext(t, mk).
A Dec PK oracle that takes as input a ciphertext C and a time t, and outputs
Dec PK (C, T S t , sk r ). Note that t need not be the "correct" release time for C. 3. A Dec RK oracle that takes as input a ciphertext C and a pre-open key V , and outputs Dec RK (C, V, sk r ). Note that V need not be the "correct" pre-open key for C.
For each of the IND games, a probabilistic, polynomial-time attacker
We may now formally define the security models for formalising the security against the above four types of adversaries. 
Definition 1 (Outsider Security). A TRE-PC scheme Π is said to be IND-TR-CCA OS secure if every polynomial-time attacker
It is worth stressing that we have adopted the notation "binding" which is a property of commitment schemes such as that in [5] . The binding property for TRE-PC schemes guarantees that, if the adversary has encrypted some message then it cannot release a pre-open key to force the receiver to decrypt a false message which is different from which was original sent. It is easy to see that this is an analog to the binding property in commitment schemes. The difference is that explicit proofs are usually required in commitment schemes, while no such proofs are required in a TRE-PC scheme (as shown later in our scheme). We further point out that if the receiver obtains ⊥ in the decryption then it can confirm that the sender has malfunctioned. The formalisation of ciphertext validity, as that in [9] , is outside the scope of this paper.
In fact, the binding of a TRE-PC scheme is also concerned with the secure transportation of the pre-open key when the sender decides to open the encrypted message before the pre-defined release time. If the TRE-PC scheme is binding, then the pre-open key does not need to be integrity protected; otherwise, the pre-open key should be integrity protected to guarantee that the receiver will obtain the message which the sender has intended to send.
The relationship between these notions of security is given in Fig. 2 . In this figure, "A −→ B" means that if a scheme is secure in the sense of A then it is secure in the sense of B and "A −→ B" means that we can construct a scheme which is secure in the sense of A but not secure in the sense of B. Given the relations in the figure, one can easily deduce the relation between any two security notions. Proofs of these relations can be found in the full version of the paper [11] .
TRE-PC KEMs
The use of a symmetric encryption scheme as a subroutine of an asymmetric encryption schemes has long been known as a useful technique for improving the efficiency of asymmetric encryption. Cramer and Shoup [8, 18] formalised one approach to producing such hybrid asymmetric encryption schemes. This Fig. 1 . Security models for a TRE-PC scheme Fig. 2 . Relations among the security notions 'KEM-DEM' approach has subsequently been applied to various other branches of asymmetric cryptography [3, 4, 10] and this section will explain how it can be applied to TRE-PC schemes.
A KEM-DEM scheme is composed of an asymmetric KEM and a symmetric DEM. The KEM random generates a symmetric key and an encapsulation (encryption) of that key. This symmetric key is then used by the DEM to encrypt a message. In this section, we first define a variant of KEM, namely, TRE-PC KEM, and then show that a secure TRE-PC scheme can be constructed from a secure TRE-PC KEM and a standard DEM.
Definitions of TRE-PC KEM
For the simplicity of description, the notation KEM refers to TRE-PC KEM in the following definition. A KEM consists of six probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms:
-KEM.Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter 1 as input, and generates a secret master-key mk and the public parameters param. We assume that all subsequent algorithms take param implicitly as an input -KEM.Ext: This algorithm takes the master private key mk and a time t as input, and generates a timestamp T S t . -KEM.Gen: This algorithm takes a security parameter 1 as input, and outputs a user's public/private key pair (pk r , sk r ). T S t which is determined by the release time accompanied with C, and the receiver's private key sk r as input, and returns either the encapsulated key K or an error message ⊥.
We assume that there exist a function KeyLen( ) such that the symmetric keys output by a particular TRE-PC KEM (with security parameter ) are exactly KeyLen( )-bits long.
Security Definitions of TRE-PC KEM
Just as for a TRE-PC scheme, we actually define four separate security notions for a TRE-PC KEM, one for each of the different types of attacker. These security games are shown in Fig. 3 . Once again, each attacker may have access to one or more of the following oracles:
1. An Ext oracle that takes a time t as input and outputs the timestamp T S t = Ext(t, mk). The formal definitions for the security of a TRE-PC KEM mirror those of a full TRE-PC scheme: 
Definition 5 (Outsider Security). A TRE-PC KEM Π is said to be IND-TR-CCA OS secure if every polynomial-time attacker A that does not query the
is negligible.
Construction of TRE-PC Schemes
As might be expected, we show that the combination of a secure TRE-PC KEM and a secure DEM is a secure TRE-PC scheme. We first recall the definition of a DEM [8, 18] . A DEM consists of the following two polynomial-time algorithms:
-DEM.Enc: A deterministic, polynomial-time encryption algorithm which, on the input a message m and a symmetric key K, outputs a ciphertext C. -DEM.Dec: A deterministic, polynomial-time decryption algorithm which, on the input a ciphertext C and a symmetric key K, outputs a message m or an error message ⊥.
We assume that the range of possible keys K is the same as that of the associated TRE-PC KEM, i.e. {0, 1}
KeyLen( ) . We also assume that the TRE-PC KEM and DEM are sound in that the appropriate decapsulation/decryption algorithms 'undo' the effects of the encapsulation/encryption algorithms. We may now construct a TRE-PC scheme from a TRE-PC KEM and a DEM:
-The Setup, Ext, and Gen algorithms are given by the KEM.Setup, KEM.Ext, and KEM.Gen algorithms, respectively. -The encryption algorithm Enc(m, t, pk r ) works in two steps. It first runs We also use the notion of one-time IND-CCA and IND-CPA security for a DEM that was proposed by Cramer and Shoup [8, 18] . It is not difficult to see that we can now prove the following theorems about a TRE-PC constructed from a TRE-PC KEM and a DEM. The proofs for the IND security of the composition are similar to those of Cramer and Shoup [8, 18] and can be found in the full version of the paper [11] . Note that TRE-PC KEM and and the DEM are trivially required to be sound. 
An Efficient TRE-PC KEM
In this section, we propose a concrete instantiation of a TRE-PC KEM. The scheme we propose shares similarities with the scheme proposed by Hwang, Yum and Lee [14] ; however, our scheme is substantially simpler and, when used with a suitable DEM, gives rise to a more efficient TRE-PC scheme.
The Description
Our scheme makes use of a bilinear map on a group. In other words, we assume the existence of an instance generating algorithm that, given a security parameter 1 , outputs a group description (G 1 , G T , P, q,ê), where G 1 and G T are additively written groups of prime order q, P is a generator of G 1 , andê : G 1 × G 1 → G T is a polynomial-time computable, non-degenerate, bilinear map. This is normally instantiated by a super-singular elliptic curve of small embedding degree; for more details the reader is referred to the paper of Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [13] .
The algorithms of the TRE-PC KEM are defined as follows:
-KEM.Setup: This algorithm takes the security parameter 1 as input, generates a group structure (G 1 , G T , P, q,ê) of the required security level and chooses three hash functions:
The algorithm then chooses a random element s $ ← Z q and sets S ← sP . The public parameters are param ← (G 1 , G T , P, q,ê, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , S) ; the master private key is mk ← s. -KEM.Ext: This algorithm takes the master secret mk and a time t as input, and returns T S t ← sH 1 (t).
-KEM.Gen: This algorithm randomly generates x $ ← Z q , and outputs the public/private keys sk r ← x and pk r ← xP . -KEM.Encap: This algorithm takes a release time t and the receiver's public key pk r as input, and returns (K, C, V C ), which are computed as follows:
open key V C = vQ t , and the private key sk r = x as input, and runs as follows:
, the timestamp T S t , and the private key sk r = x as input, and runs as follows:
Security results
The security of our scheme is based on two principles: that it is infeasible for any attacker who does not know the private key sk r = x to compute the value X 1 = xC * 1 and that it is infeasible for any attacker who does not know either the master private key, the pre-open key or the appropriate timestamp to compute the value X 2 =ê(P, P ) rvs for the given value of C * 2 . We prove the security of our scheme in the random oracle model under the following assumptions:
Definition 9 (Computational Diffie-Hellman). Given a group description (G 1 , G T , P, q,ê) generated at a security level 1 and a pair of group elements (αP, βP ), where α, β $ ← Z q , the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is to determine αβP . The CDH assumption is that no probabilistic, polynomialtime algorithm can solve this problem with non-negligible probability.
Definition 10 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman). Given a group description (G 1 , G T , P, q,ê) generated at a security level 1 and a triple of group elements (αP, βP, γP ), where α, β, γ $ ← Z q , the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem is to determineê(P, P ) αβγ . The BDH assumption is that no probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm can solve this problem with non-negligible probability.
These computational assumptions allow us to prove the follow theorems about the IND security of our scheme. Proof. We construct an algorithm B which solves the CDH problem with nonnegligible probability whenever A breaks the IND-TR-CCA TS security of the TRE-PC KEM with non-negligible advantage. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an IND-TR-CCA TS attacker with non-negligible advantage. B runs as follows:
1. Receive an instance of the group on which the CDH problem is to be solved (G 1 , G T , P, q,ê) and a CDH challenge (αP, βP ). 2. Game setup: Randomly select s $ ← Z q and set S = sP . The public parameters are param ← (G 1 , G T , P, q,ê, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , S) and the master private key is mk ← s. Set the user's public key to be pk r ← αP . 
